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Abstract
Extreme events are sometimes defined as unexpected events in which local resources are
insufficient to cope with the extent of the damage and require outside resources to address the
hazards specific to the event. For that reason, communities immediately adjacent to disaster
areas have a unique and important role in the study of measures to mitigate the effects of the
resulting hazards to human life and property. This exploratory study looks at the use of
information technology in conjunction with disaster mitigation activities in areas adjacent to a
large disaster. The experiences, thoughts, and beliefs of individuals involved in mitigation
activities at Louisiana State University immediately following Hurricane Katrina and the
resulting large scale evacuation of New Orleans were captured through interviews in which
cognitive maps were developed. Through a Grounded Theory approach, the data was analyzed
for theoretical fit. In the early analysis the data grouped itself into three main stories; the
Implementers, Decision Makers, and the Vendor stories.
The best theoretical fit was found in elements of Improvisation Theory. Specifically,
alignment was found in the use of “Bricolage” in solving problems, the unique elements that
resulted in a climate of openness to improvisational processes, and the improvisation of
command and control. Finally, other research questions that came up in the course of the study
are examined.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
Extreme events, or disasters as they are more commonly known, occur at a random, but nevertheless
regular rate. Still somewhat unpredictable despite advances in safety procedures, federal protection and
mitigation projects, and meteorological predictive modeling, they wreak damage that currently stretches
into the billions of dollars and is increasing each year at a rate well in excess of inflation. The figures in
Figure 1 illustrate the rise in the cost of natural disasters over the course of the second half of the 20th
century. (http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Study/RisingCost/rising_cost2.html)

Figure 1.1 Rising Cost of Natural Disasters (Graph by Robert Simmon, based on data courtesy EMDAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database (www.em-dat.net) Université Catholique de
Louvain—Brussels, Belgium)
While arguments about the effects of climate change are currently being developed and made,
the reasons for the rise in cost are less about climate change than they are about human and
technological change. Today’s populations are obviously larger than in the past. But increasingly, more
people are choosing to live in to areas that pose higher risk to damage from natural and man-made
hazards. Human beings have a great desire to live in areas where they can enjoy the beauty of nature on
a continuous basis. The problem lies in the fact that the beauty of coastal shorelines, hillsides, and
geologically unstable areas bring with them higher risks to natural hazards. Another desire of human
beings is for convenience. Populations of workers have built communities ever closer to industrial sites
increasing the risks of man-made events.
1

Another factor in the rising cost of extreme events is the technology-based society that has
developed over the last decade following the creation of the Internet. Computers and electronics have
penetrated nearly every facet of our lives. However, electronic equipment is much more sensitive to
damage and much less repairable than the industrial strength equipment of previous generations.
Finally, business today is much more efficient and has embraced just-in-time methodologies in
supply chains to a larger degree. The result is that business organizations are much more interdependent
on each other and sensitive to interruptions to the supply chain thus making those interruptions more
costly.
The hurricanes which struck the Louisiana and Mississippi gulf coasts in 2005 left an indelible
mark on the cities, the towns, and the people who inhabit those regions. These communities have a long
experience with natural disasters and the rebuilding process as a result of the seasonal storms that visit it
every year. But the magnitude of the disaster wrought by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita had no equal in
the life experience of the inhabitants of coastal Louisiana and Mississippi. The extent of the damage
was such that while the effects of the storms may have been minimal a mere one hundred miles inland
from the coast, the impact on New Orleans sent ripples that reached the entire breadth of the country.
As might be expected, the impact on the areas adjacent to New Orleans and the Mississippi Gulf Coast,
while a mere fraction of those areas and not comparable by any measure to the disaster sites, was still
considerable. The flow of evacuees from the large New Orleans metropolitan area put strains on the
infrastructure and society of the surrounding areas.
Extreme events are sometimes defined as unexpected events in which local resources are
insufficient to cope with the extent of the damage and require outside resources to address the hazards
specific to the event. For that reason, communities immediately adjacent to disaster areas have a unique
and important role in the study of measures to mitigate the effects of the resulting hazards to human life
and property. This study looks at those efforts, and specifically the information and technology aspects
2

of those efforts, through a Grounded Theory approach to attempt to learn from one of the largest natural
disasters that the U.S. has experienced in recent times.

Figure 1.2 Critical Care Facility, Louisiana State University, 2005
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review
2.1 Disaster Studies
Depending on your definition of “Man”, humans have been subjected to natural disasters
since their arrival more than three millennia ago. In more recent times man has contrived to
invent a few disasters of his own and found new ways to expose himself to and exacerbate the
effects of nature. As the world’s population has grown, these “extreme events” have caused
uncounted loss of life and property. In addition, the growth of societal networks
(communication, transportation, supply) and the complexity of human organization have
magnified their effect. Despite this fact, research of these extreme events as an organized field
of study is a relatively new development. Only in the last few decades has a noticeable body of
work begun to be published especially following the man-made event of 9/11 in New York City
and the natural disaster wrought by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. Researchers who have
recognized the need to understand these events have begun to try to define and organize the
topics that are encompassed today through disaster studies.
To gain an understanding of the field of disaster studies, we should perhaps begin with a
definition of a disaster or “extreme event.” However, researchers have not found that task to be
a simple one. The website “thefreedictionary.com” (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/)
provides the following definition, “An occurrence causing widespread destruction and distress; a
catastrophe.” Another definition comes from the website of the Journal of Prehospital and
Disaster Medicine (JPDM as of 2007) (http://pdm.medicine.wisc.edu/vocab%20new.htm
accessed 1/15/2007). “A serious disruption of the functioning of society, causing widespread
human, material or environmental losses which exceed the ability of affected society to cope
using only its own resources.” This second definition captures the element of a disaster that is
commonly recognized as distinguishing these types of events from others. It describes the
4

characteristic of disasters as typically requiring assistance over and above that available from
local government and resources. Disasters require or compel other, unaffected resources or
organizations to come to the aid of the stricken area. It is this quality along with the tremendous
cost in lives and property that has caused extreme events to become an emerging theme in
research today.
A perspective on the part of researchers that might seem unusual at first is the
observation that while there are indeed negative effects of disasters, there are also positive
effects (Pielke and Sarewitz 2000). For example, a flood may devastate an agricultural area, but
the flood waters may enrich the soil, enhancing crops in subsequent years. By far, and
unfortunately, the most beneficial effects of extreme events are the knowledge and experience
gained from them and the hope that the lessons learned can be used to mitigate other events.
Presently, a good deal of disaster research focuses on studying decision making and
improvisational processes that organizations undertake in responding and mitigating extreme
events. The use of social network modeling techniques, group decision support tools, and
techniques that capture cognitive and behavioral processes are also seen as appropriate to
developing data about organizations involved in these types of events (Mendonca and Wallace
2004).
2.1.1 Capturing and Assimilating Lessons from Extreme Events
One of the salient questions in disaster studies today is why, considering the regular
occurrence of disaster, we have not learned to more effectively anticipate, respond, and mitigate
these events (Donahue and Tuohy 2006). Donahue and Tuohy (2006) state that true learning
from these events is much more difficult. The case studies and other documentary evidence are
there, but they seem to be either un-communicated or when communicated, presented in a way
that the lessons are situationally specific and cannot be generalized to other types of events.
5

The problem of communicating the lessons from an event may be because the lessons are
viewed from a phenomenological perspective and rarely related in a structured way and
communicated in the context of the common set of adverse effects that disparate extreme events
produce. This means that while phenomena that cause extreme events are disparate, there are
common effects. For example, the disruption of communications, contamination of water
supplies, and displacement of populations could be considered common effects caused by either
an earthquake or a hurricane. It is now understood that different types of events may have very
similar immediate consequences for responders and similar long-term consequences for society.
2.1.2 The Future of Disaster Studies
Despite the focus on the phenomena that cause disasters, from a positive perspective,
specialized knowledge is being developed to address the causes and effects of extreme events.
However, the lack of collaborative cross-discipline focus on the effects of these events may lead
to research in disasters becoming balkanized and leave the real lessons of extreme events
unlearned (Pielke and Sarewitz 2000). Areas of ongoing research include the use of remote
sensing, communications and information systems, warning and response strategies, decision
making processes, community vulnerability, and methods for learning and creating useable
knowledge from extreme events. The contention is that what is lacking is an integration and
collaboration of research efforts.
Under increasing study today in connection with disaster research is the area of decision
support systems. Mendonca, drawing from previous research in jazz improvisation, pursued
research into developing requirements for decision support software systems that could assist
organizations in determining not only how to improvise in the response to extreme events, but
also when to improvise (Mendonca 2007). In his study, Mendonca used data collected from
subjects who participated in the response to the 2001 World Trade Center attack. He used a
6

cognitive task analysis method called the critical decision method which entails semi-structured
interviews that seek to elicit knowledge about decision making in relation to the event and
develop new knowledge based on a subject’s experience.
The use of graphical tools in methods of sense-making of extreme events is another area
of study. In an attempt to understand the cognitive processes of emergency responders,
Alexander (2004) conducted a study of the ability of individuals to visualize the circumstances of
extreme events and capture their thinking about the appropriate responses to those events. His
study entailed having emergency managers develop spatial cognitive maps for a simulated event.
Through the study he found that individual thinking and retained knowledge about a single
shared event varied to a large degree. This finding underscored and re-emphasized the critical
role communication plays in managing and decision-making in connection with an extreme
event.
By far the most prevalent research in relation to disasters is the case study. In a study of
the events surrounding a toxic cloud crisis near Nantes, France in 1987, Roux-Dufort looked at
failures to improvise and incorrect decision-making among four groups involved in the response
to a fire that produced a cloud of potentially toxic fumes (Roux-Dufort and Vidaillet 2003). The
conclusions from the study pointed to the presence of multiple, uncoordinated groups as
elements in the lack of improvisation and good decision-making in the course of the event.
The study of the phenomena of disaster and their effects has now begun to move towards
efforts to distinguish and classify events that are predictable from those that can be understood
but not predicted. This research, combined with a new focus on the commonality of effects
between different event types, is expected to contribute to methods of effective elicitation of data
for disaster studies.

7

2.2 Cognitive Maps and Mapping
The development of Cognitive Mapping as a technique for capturing the “thinking”
surrounding a problem or situation has been ongoing for decades and stems from the work of
Tolman (1948) and from the theory of personal constructs developed by George Kelly (1955)
(Eden 2004). Personal construct theory proposes that people make sense of their world by
seeking to manage and control the conditions and environment around them. Because of that
focus on an individual’s world as a series of problems, cognitive mapping is considered a
valuable tool in capturing the thoughts and beliefs, or cognitive processes, of an individual about
those problems. Among other things, cognitive processes can include an individual’s
perceptions and interpretations of an event or issue, and decision rules and strategies for dealing
with uncertainty (Axelrod 1976). At a higher level, cognitive maps may chart the connections
between organizations and the environment within which they operate. The connections that tie
our world together and that we attempt to capture in cognitive maps are the connections that tie
thought together (Bougon, Weick et al. 1977).
What exactly are cognitive maps? The various definitions put forward by the many
authors who have written and researched their identification, construction and analysis all sound
somewhat similar, but each one contributes to an understanding of what cognitive maps are and
where their value lies. Cossette and Audet (1992) defined cognitive maps as “graphic
representations of a set of discursive representations made by a subject with regards to an object
in the context of a particular interaction” (Cossette and Audet 1992, p.327). That definition
underscores the fact that it is the assertions made by a subject about a particular issue that are
what is captured in the map. The definition, or description, by Fiol (1992) that cognitive maps
are “graphic representations of an individual’s thinking about a particular problem” and “provide
a frame of reference for what is known and believed” is very similar to that of Cossette and
8

Audet and underscores the fact that cognitive maps are fundamentally graphic depictions of
thought (Fiol and Huff 1992).
Before accepting the purpose and value of cognitive maps, however, many authors
caution against any assumptions of the empiricism of cognitive maps. While the term cognitive
map implies a map of the thought and belief of an individual or group, there are considerations to
be made before accepting that premise entirely. The “truth” or “reality” of a map is dependent
on the adequacy of the theory underlying the model and on the method used to elicit the map
(Eden 1992). In addition, the thoughts and beliefs that are revealed in the construction of a map
may be very different from true reality and might indeed, change at any given point in time and
as memories age over time (Fahey and Narayanan 1989). Finally, cognitive maps suffer from
limitations in our abilities to quantitatively analyze the data they contain and their limitations in
capturing thought that is not cause-effect based (Axelrod 1976). However, cognitive maps have
a special value in understanding human sense-making of complex situations and have a strong
claim as a method for communicating that sense making. More reasonable claims for cognitive
maps are that they have the capacity to represent subjective data in a meaningful way and can
contribute to a process of decision making, problem solving, and negotiation (Eden 1992).
2.2.1 Efficacy of Cognitive Maps and Mapping
However imperfect cognitive maps may be in capturing reality, it is that quest to attempt
to capture and communicate the reality of complex issues that attracts researchers to it and other
methods. The value of an empirical method of recording human cognition in relation to
problems that vex society would be tremendous. In the absence of such a method, cognitive
mapping has become a leading technique in attempts to bring structure to problems and to
analyze them. One benefit of cognitive mapping is in its ability to surface the central concepts of
an issue frequently referred to as the “nub” of an issue (Ackerman, Eden et al. 1992).
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Frequently, these core goals or options are known, but their relationship to other goals or options
and to each other are frequently elusive. Cognitive maps also bring the various detail of a
problem and the chain of an individual’s thinking about that problem into a single focus (Fahey
and Narayanan 1989). At the same time, the technique attempts to overcome the limits of
humans to perceive, understand, and make sense of problems, and to think beyond their
immediate context or reality and the imperfection, impermanence, and mutability of human
memory (Laukkanen 1994). Finally, in today’s uncertain world, researchers contend that
cognitive maps are important tools in understanding organizational contexts and provide a new
way to examine and improve managerial decisions and judgment (Fiol and Huff 1992).
2.2.2 Elicitation Methods
Researchers have described several methods for eliciting the data required to develop
cognitive maps and each of these methods has particular strengths and limitations. The three
method types were described by Axelrod in 1976 and include derivation from existing
documentation or text, questionnaires, and face-to-face interaction (Axelrod 1976). The
derivation of maps from documents is considered a valid and reliable method of elicitation. The
limitation of the method lies in the data being essentially fixed with no opportunity to further
develop or enhance the data. Thus the map is available to the researcher.
The use of questionnaires for developing data is a popular method today. This method is
considered superior to document analysis due to its flexibility in capturing a wider range of
information. There is current debate that questionnaires such as the Self-Q instrument developed
by Michel Bougon may be superior to other methods including open-ended interview techniques
(Eden 2004).
The third method of deriving cognitive maps entails the use of face-to-face individual and
group interviews for developing data and in many cases for concurrently developing the map
10

itself. The advantage of this method is that it allows the researcher to interact with the source of
data and pursue concepts in the course of the interview. This method can be further categorized
by whether the data and/or the map are developed from a single individual or a group of
individuals. Another scenario combines the individual and group approaches by aggregating
individual maps to form an aggregate group map.
2.2.3 Map Construction
The mechanics of constructing a cognitive map on the surface seem relatively easy. They
are composed of conceptual “nodes” based on what is said by the individual serving as the data
source and arrows linking those concepts together. The linking arrows are qualified by positive
and negative signs to indicate whether they facilitate a particular goal or option or whether they
obstruct it. As simple as that sounds there are several hurdles to developing a credible map
(Ackerman, Eden et al. 1992). One of the obvious problems is that it is exceedingly difficult to
listen, understand what is being said, and construct the map concurrently. Developing this
ability takes some measure of time and practice. Another pitfall that researchers new to
cognitive mapping run into is their tendency to try and record everything that is being spoken by
the data source. A certain amount of what is said in an interview is repetitive but couched in
different wording. Finally, difficulties arrive in simply managing the recording of the map on
paper. In the development process the map may tend to look disorganized, but the use of A4 size
paper and beginning the map two thirds of the way up the page help to reduce that
disorganization allowing “head” nodes or core concepts to float to the top and “tails” or options
to float lower in the map. Head nodes frequently correlate to the goals of the problem and tails
to initial options or conditions affecting the achievement of those goals.
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2.2.4 Analysis of Maps
As mentioned previously, researchers have long known that maps are resistant to
quantitative analysis, but the analysis of cognitive maps has shown that it is possible to bring to
light information that would otherwise be difficult to obtain (Cossette and Audet 1992). Over
the past several decades several methods of analysis have been identified that can be applied to
cognitive maps. Some of the methods include cluster analysis, looking for potent nodes or
options, virtuous and vicious cycles, central issues termed “nubs”, and shape (Eden 2004).
Cluster analysis involves looking for groups or “islands” of related concepts within a
larger map of interrelated concepts that have few or even no relationships with other groups.
Once identified, the analysis of these groups can be pursued along two paths. The clusters can
be analyzed without taking into consideration connections to other groups or they can be looked
at by including the relationships they may have to other clusters.
Maps can also be analyzed by looking for “potent” concept nodes or options that may
appear in multiple clusters that may indicate central themes. These potent nodes are frequently
an indicator of a core concept regarding the problem.
Virtuous or vicious circles (sometimes referred to as cycles or loops) are another
characteristic looked for in cognitive maps. A circle with an odd number of negatively signed
arrows indicates a vicious circle if the resulting goal is considered an undesirable one. Changing
the map by removing one of the negative arrows or causations, transforms the circle to a virtuous
one.
Searching a map for “nub” issues is another method of map analysis. This type of
analysis is also called domain analysis because it looks at the total number of in arrows and out
arrows from a specific node to find significance. The measures of the number of in arrows and
out arrows of a node are also called the in-degree and out-degree of a node.
12

The shape of the graphic generated by the mapping process, while considered
problematic, can also be a characteristic for analysis. A generally flat shape indicates little depth
in the thinking about a problem, but an awareness of a large number of options. A tall, thin
shape suggests few options, but a greater depth of understanding of an issue. Individuals
inexperienced in cognitive mapping tend to generate maps with fewer concepts and more arrows
than more experienced researchers.
Recent research has begun to focus on detecting and analyzing change in maps over time
in order to understand to what degree maps remain consistent and to study the forces influencing
change if detected. There is also interest by researchers in the value of cognitive maps in
highlighting priorities relative to issues and their effectiveness in supplying information that may
be missed by current mapping techniques and theory (Fiol and Huff 1992).
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Chapter 3 - Research Method
3.1 Data Collection
The method of data collection and analysis for the study was based on the works of
Kelton, and Ackerman and Eden (Eden 1992; Kelton, Mendonca et al. 2000). In “Acquiring and
Assessing Knowledge from Multiple Experts using Graphical Representations,” Kelton discusses
a number of methods for eliciting expert knowledge from individuals and recording that
knowledge using graphical methods. One of the methods they discuss is the use of cognitive
maps to capture expert knowledge from individual or group interviews. In order to better
understand the cognitive mapping method, Ackerman and Eden’s white paper on cognitive
mapping, “Getting Started with Cognitive Mapping,” was used to gain insight into the method of
eliciting and constructing individual maps.
3.1.1 Subject Selection
The source of data for this study came from the population of southern Louisiana citizens
who experienced the effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and were involved in applying
technology in the response to the effects of those events. The primary participants targeted for
the study were current and former employees of LSU who were involved in making decisions
about, developing, or implementing technology solutions as part of the LSU campus response
and mitigation efforts related to Hurricane Katrina. A second source of participants was
employees of Louisiana universities or agencies who were involved in similar technology and
response activities as a result of the hurricanes.
In recruiting subjects for this study, potential subjects were identified by looking at their
role at the University and the role’s potential for the type of involvement in extreme events that
are of interest in the study. Typically, they were persons in technology leadership and
implementation positions. Special attention was paid to individuals who operated at the CIO or
14

CIO staff levels, departmental IT coordinators, technology architects, computer analysts, and
communications and computer technicians. They were initially contacted via e-mail. The e-mail
described the study, the researchers, and the nature of the participation being requested of them.
Other participants were revealed based on referrals from participants contributing to the study.
3.1.2 Interviews
In order to develop the procedure for data collection, two pilot interviews were conducted
and the technique for developing cognitive maps refined. The pilot interviews were recorded
and the recordings used to validate and further develop the maps. The informed consent briefing
and forms were also included in the pilot process. The data elicited in the pilot interviews was
included in the complete set of data used in the study.
The larger body of interviews, consisting of an additional eight subjects, was conducted
in settings chosen by the subjects. The duration of the interviews ranged between 45 and 65
minutes. During the course of the interviews, the maps were developed interactively with the
subject to insure continuous validation of the maps. The complete interviews were audio-taped
in order to capture further detail from the subject and for later validation of the constructed maps.
See the Interview Guide included in Appendix A for the basic flow and structure of the
interviews.
3.2 Data Analysis
The process of data analysis involved all three types of data captured in the course of the
ten interviews. The three data types included the cognitive maps developed in the course of the
interview, the transcripts of the interviews, and to a limited extent, the tapes of the interviews.
The tapes were used in addition to the transcripts in cases when it was felt a richer
communication medium was needed to understand the stress or importance of particular
statements made by the subject. The data was analyzed qualitatively for major themes within the
15

set of data recorded for each subject. The process of analysis was influenced by the work of
Baskerville, and Ackermann and Eden (Baskerville, Pawlowski et al. 2000; Eden 2004). Early in
the process, groups emerged from within the data along the lines of roles in connection with the
subjects’ experiences during the event. The subjects aligned into three groups which were
labeled “implementers”, “decision makers”, and “vendor”. The implementers group was
composed of four individuals who were, in many cases, directly engaged in installing and/or
operating the IT equipment and systems used in the effort. The decision makers group consisted
of five individuals who acted in capacities closer to the point where decisions on efforts and
resources were made. Finally, the vendor group represents a middle group operating sometimes
within the other groups and more frequently, between the other two groups. This group
consisted of a single individual who was present throughout the time that the emergency
facilities remained open at LSU and participated in most, if not all, of the IT initiatives connected
with the emergency efforts. The resulting themes were studied in the context of several
theoretical constructs including improvisation (Wachtendorf 2004), adaptive structuration
(DeSanctis 1994), and social theory (Bogard 1988). Improvisation theory was selected as the
best fit based on the developed themes. Based on the selection of improvisation theory, the
cognitive maps were revisited and a group map, or story, was developed from the collected maps
of the group. Each of the stories revolves around several goals that the group identified as their
primary focus during the event.
3.2.1 Implementer Story
The map for this story can be found in Figure 2.1. One of the first goals for this group,
even before evacuees began arriving, was to set up a communications network for the emergency
agencies arriving on campus (1). The campus facilities designated for emergency operations had
little Internet and voice network connections so a number of approaches were followed to meet
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11 satellite uplinks
available near site

8 local cellular
system saturated

17 decision made to
relax security
23 wireless network
available on campus

7 alternative
communications
methods available
(radios, etc)

-

1 (goal) provide
emergency agencies
with communications
infrastructure

10 necessary skilled
personnel available

18 need to secure
protected
information on
evacuees

4 (goal) capture,
organize, and
communicate
information on
injured evacuees

19 some capacity to
bring wired
connections into
site

-

-

9 some email
capacity available
on campus

12 some local
communications and
other IT resources
available

13 needs assessments
performed

-

21 no software
systems at hand or
known

20 create adhoc
information systems

16 no previous
comparable
experience

15 common carriers
unavailable to bring
additional resources
to site

25 insufficient time
to assess true needs

24 vendor donations
of computers,
software, and
personnel

22 limited
availability of IT
equipment and
resources

2 (goal) provide
emergency agencies
with IT support for
on-site operations

-

-

-

-

27 develop estimate
of floor space

26 faculty engaged
to find answer

Figure 3.1 – Implementer Cognitive Map
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-

5 (goal) coordinate
volunteers

-

3 (goal) control
scarce IT resources

6 (goal) determine
how many people/beds
the PMAC sports
arena can
accommodate?

-

14 competition for
resources

11 suspend
installation
standards &rules

6 phone bank needed
for evacuees

8 evacuees have
phones, but no
chargers

-

3 (goal) track,
organize, and
effectively utilize
volunteers

2 (goal) provide IT
resources to
emergency agencies

1 (goal) facilitate
communications
between evacuees and
their families

16 categorize
volunteers by skill

-

10 insufficient
resources for
emergency agencies
at site

17 cellular systems
saturated

15 IT vendor
donations of
equipment &
personnel

14 teams improvised
to address long list
of needs

7 central IT called
in to provide phones

9 chargers found at
local retailer

-

5 (goal) enable
short range
communications
between campus units
and emergency
agencies

18 availability of
text messaging

13 new, untested
VOIP technology
deployed

12 some resources
available on campus

19 expanded
deployment of campus
radio system

Figure 3.2 – Decision Maker Cognitive Map
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4 (goal)track
patients in PMAC and
Field House
facilities

20 change existing
software or quickly
develop new
application

3 no pre-existing
information systems
in place to fully
manage information
being collected

1 Track evacuees
arriving and passing
through site
4 collection of
available local
resources before
site opened for
evacuees

22 campus leadership

6 contention by
agencies for data

2 (goal) organize
and digitally
capture diverse
collection of
information on
evacuees

-

-

-

-

21 minimal command &
control

5 existing systems
not capable of data
interchange

-

8 system must be a
distributed
information system
to collect and
maintain the data

14 "Groove" solution
developed by on and
off-site vendor team

9 availability of
common desktop
software drove
solutions initially

23 no coordinated
state leadership
on-site

19 vendor access to
international
resources

13 vendor's previous
experience with
disaster response

16 vendor employee
"grassroots",
eagerness to
contribute

Figure 3.3 – Vendor Cognitive Map
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this goal including bringing in additional IP network connections (19), leveraging the existing
campus wireless network (23), and alternative communications such as handheld radios (7). Cell
phones were of little or no use right after the hurricane as the cellular systems was saturated with
call attempts from individuals attempting to make contact with family members (8). It was
several days before the cell system could be utilized to any serviceable degree. E-mail services
were available from a margin of excess capacity in the central campus system (9). The presence
of some skilled personnel and equipment from the central campus IT organization allowed a
communications network to ultimately be put in place (10) (12).
The next goal identified by the implementers group entailed providing IT agencies at the
sites with general IT equipment and support (2). Despite the time constraints of the situation
(25), the IT staff took the time to conduct a needs assessment in order to determine the entire
picture and prioritize the distribution of limited resources (13). The limited resources situation
was exacerbated in the first weeks following the hurricane due to the restrictions on shipping into
the Baton Rouge area (15).
In the short time before the campus had to be made available to state and federal
emergency agencies (25), the capacity of available facilities in terms of people and beds had to
be established (6). Faculty members were contacted and asked to help determine those
capacities (26). One of the first things they focused on was calculating the total floor space of
the facilities (27).
Many of the agencies that came to setup operations on campus arrived with little or no IT
resources to support their operations. Thus, the demand for IT resources was much higher than
the available resources (3). The lack of space on common carrier shipping resources prevented
one avenue of solution to the problem (15), and the competition for the limited resources became
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predictable as agencies argued with IT staff about why they should receive preference in the
allocation of resources (14).
As the evacuation of New Orleans gained momentum, evacuees were being transported
to the far corners of the state and the country. Families were separated from each other with no
means of finding each other even if they were within a hundred yards of each other. A common
goal mentioned across many of the interviews was the need to capture, organize, and
communicate information about evacuees passing through the emergency facilities (4). The
issue of securing the data being captured was an immediate concern (18), but the urgency of
getting the process underway made it obvious that normal security measures could not be put in
place (17), and the unencrypted wireless and wired network connections were used to exchange,
synchronize, and transmit data (23) (19).
A final goal described by the group was the need for a system to capture information on
the thousands of volunteers showing up to contribute to the efforts so that they could be
scheduled and allocated to specific tasks and any special skills exploited (5). Since no existing
systems or COTS software was known to fit the situation (21), it was determined that an ad hoc
solution should be developed as quickly as possible (20). An IT vendor who happened to be on
campus was consulted and arranged for the use of licensed software and programmers to quickly
customize software originally developed following the 2004 Tsunami disaster (24).
Finally, many of the subjects in this group described having no previous experience that
they could compare with this event (16), and the constant struggle to accomplish so much by
pulling together, in many cases, odds and ends of equipment and personnel (22).
3.2.2 Decision Maker Story
The map for this story can be found in Figure 2.2. One of the first goals identified by this
group was to find a way for evacuees to communicate with their extended families living outside
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of the disaster area (1). Many of the evacuees had cell phones, but due to the saturation of the
cellular network and the fact that few of the evacuees had chargers for their phones, cellular
service was insufficient to play a significant role in the initial solution to this problem (17) (8).
However, chargers were acquired to contribute to the efforts at a solution (9). At that point the
campus central voice services group was called in to provide assistance in setting up a phone
bank for the evacuees (6) (7).
A second goal identified by this group was to provide IT resources to emergency
agencies (2). This situation presented itself almost immediately as the numbers of evacuees
quickly overwhelmed the few IT resources that the emergency agencies brought to the site (10).
Fortunately, the voice services group had been testing voice over IP (VOIP) telephone equipment
and was approaching the point of implementing this technology on campus. They were
confident enough in it to deploy it to partially satisfy this need (13). At this point, vendor
donations of equipment further supplemented the need for equipment in this area (15). The
suspension of installation standards and other policies and rules allowed solutions to be put into
service at the earliest possible moment (11).
The need to track, organize, and effectively utilize the thousands of volunteers
descending on the two sites became an imperative almost immediately after it was opened (3).
Attempts were made to assess volunteers for special skills in order to utilize them as effectively
as possible (16), but ultimately volunteers were asked to do whatever was needed most at the
particular moment (14).
The operations on the campus centered around two functions: the operation of a critical
patient care facility and a special needs shelter. The number of evacuees being brought into
these two sites was well in excess of planned expectations and no provisions were made for
information systems to track patient information as is found in most hospitals. A system was
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desperately needed to maintain patient information in these two facilities (4). Initial work
focused on whether any existing software systems could be adapted to the task or whether new
software would have to be acquired or developed (20).
The efforts made to communicate and coordinate the needs of emergency agencies and
campus units was identified as a problem which existed to one degree or another throughout the
first week following the hurricane (5). Several technologies were drawn into solving the
problem. While cellular systems were saturated from the voice aspect, text messaging was still
fairly reliable and was used to mitigate communications problems (18). Reserves of radio
equipment were also put into the mix (19).
A final perspective of this group’s information points to the fact that while some
resources were available on campus to draw from (12), overall the resources available were
insufficient to meet the needs of all agencies (10) and the effect of the shortfall was felt in
attempts to meet all of the goals mentioned by this group.
3.2.3 Vendor Story
The map for the vendor story is recorded in Figure 2.3. Unusually, the vendor story
begins at approximately the same time as the other stories which is before the arrival of
evacuees. The reason for this was that the vendor happened to be a resident of the area and had
come to the campus to proactively look for ways to contribute. He worked with central IT staff
in the collection of available resources for use in the two evacuee sites and observed the early
needs for information systems and their associated inadequacies (3) (4) (5).
Significantly, the vendor map differs from the other two in that the vendor experience
was centered on a single goal. The goal was expressed in two parts; the ultimate goal and the IT
related goal. The ultimate goal was expressed as the need to record the fact that individual
human beings were passing through the sites so that families and emergency agencies at
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locations further away from the disaster area could track the identity and number of people,
where they came from, where they were going, and their condition (1). The IT related goal was
to put a distributed information system in place that was easily modified to capture this diverse
collection of information and enable its transmission to sites further up the evacuation chain (2)
(8). While it was recognized that there was no off the shelf system that could be dropped in (3),
the vendor’s vast resources, work and experience with other disasters from the larger
organizational standpoint, and the sheer desire of the vendor’s employees at a grassroots level
could be leveraged to augment the efforts on-site and deliver a solution quickly (13) (16) (19).
The vendor team quickly adapted work done in the wake of the tsunami disaster to provide the
solution (14).
The vendor story includes a sort of postscript in regards to activities that happened after
the solution was put in place and the time and resource urgency of the situation began to subside.
At that point, contention for the information product of the new system began with agencies
arguing for ownership of the information (6), which was exacerbated by the lack of central
command and control of the site (21) (23). The influence of the improvised campus command
and control structure served as a thin, but clarifying source of control over the sites and processes
of the effort (22).
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Chapter 4 – Discussion and Implications
4.1 Introduction
As improvisation theory was selected as the best theoretical lens to explain the events at
LSU following the hurricanes, the best place to begin the discussion of this research is with an
understanding of some of the theory surrounding improvisation. Improvisation has been
described as the point where the conception or composition of a solution converges with its
execution. One of the major components of improvisation theory discussed by many researchers
revolves around systems that describe “types” or “categories” that can be used to describe
specific improvisational activities (Moorman and Miner 1998; Wachtendorf 2004).
One of the early improvisation type frameworks was described by Moorman and Miner
(1998) using examples from jazz improvisation. Their framework described three types of
improvisational behavior. The first type of improvisation they described as an activity where
only modest changes were made to a pre-existing process. Embellishment and ornamentation are
other words they used to describe this level of improvisation. The next type of improvisation
they described as activity where there is a stronger departure from the “referent”, or basis of the
action being considered. The referent can be any activity that the improviser has immediately at
hand to work with; a sequence of musical notes in jazz or a prior experience considered to be
similar in some context to the current situation. The third type or level of improvisation involves
the migration to, or creation of, a completely new approach or solution devised in the same
timeframe that it is required.
“a member of the UNO information staff … showed up at the information systems office and
was looking for a way to get communication with the [students and employees of] UNO
reestablished.” (reproductive improvisation)
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Another system of segregating improvisational activities is based on outcomes as
proposed by Wachtendorf (2004). This system categorizes improvisation into reproductive,
adaptive, and creative actions. The lowest level is described as reproductive improvisation. In
reproductive improvisation, the focus is on recreating a capacity that pre-existed and has been
lost or destroyed. Improvisation occurs in the means used to accomplish the restoration of the
pre-existing service or structure.
“once things settled down from the initial crisis and school started again, … we needed to
work on applications that allowed displaced students who needed to register with LSU. And
there was even a late registration service center for displaced hurricane victims.” (adaptive
improvisation)
The next level in Wachtendorf’s system is termed adaptive improvisation. At this level
an existing solution is modified to meet the requirements of the new situation. Improvisation
occurs in the creation of the changes to the existing system.
“one of the big things that we spent a lot of time on and I had guys in Redmond and Walter,
Mass. that work for the Groove Development Office that was doing a whole lot of work for
us … in the back end to get that [evacuee] data out, to get that data into Groove so that all
that information would be trackable in a central location” (creative improvisation)
The final level of improvisation in this system is called creative improvisation. This
level of activity entails the creation of a new solution without prior example. The entire activity
at this level can be considered part of the improvisation.
This research proposes that the efforts in emergency response following the 2005
hurricanes fall primarily into the areas of adaptive and creative improvisation. Contributions
were certainly made to the reproductive improvisation processes undertaken by organizations
displaced by the flooding following the hurricanes, but only from the standpoint of consulting
input and thus, are excluded from this study.
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4.2 “Bricolage” at LSU
A core concept in improvisation is that of “Bricolage”, or “making do with the materials
at hand” (Moorman 1998). Materials can be anything that could be considered necessary to the
solution being considered including tangibles such as computers, enabling commercial software,
skilled or unskilled personnel, and customized software systems. The ability of improvisers to
use knowledge and memory for improvisation was also discussed by Moorman and Miner
(1998). They describe two types of memory and the interplay of those types in the process of
improvisation. Declarative memory is the term used for the human ability to remember facts or
principles. This memory or knowledge is not necessarily attributable to a specific experience,
but is simply part of our basic understanding the world around us. The second type of memory is
procedural memory, or the memory of how things are performed or accomplished. This type of
memory is more often associated with experiential knowledge or knowledge of particular
process. The true value of these memory types relative to improvisation is dependent on the
improviser’s ability to use declarative memory to leverage procedural memory in creating
solutions to the problems at hand.
“we have the resources, the school was shut down so we had the labs that had the computers
that had the printers that could be used. We had the laptops through the library stock that
students could check out now; we used those laptops. The laptops in ITS that weren’t being
used, we took those laptops. We used any resources we could get our hands on and put it in
the PMAC and Field House.”
Following the arrival on campus of the first state agencies and before the actual opening
of the two facilities, the process of bricolage began as IT personnel began looking for ways to
meet the demands for computers, printers, fax, and communications. The technology
environment of the University provided a source from which improvisation could begin. A
critical factor in leveraging that technology was the knowledge of where on the campus it was
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located and who controlled it. Due to the support from all levels of the campus, that knowledge
and the permission to leverage those resources were quickly provided.
“I didn’t have the skills to deal with every single situation but I did have access to people
who did.”
“Now [vendor] came to the rescue in the PMAC…. They came in and played a sizeable
(role)…”
Another component of the bricolage process was finding skilled, experienced personnel
to put solutions and infrastructure in place for the emergency agencies. That process involved
finding people immediately available to make those solutions happen.

Finding skilled

personnel was not so much the problem as finding sufficient skilled personnel to meet the crush
in demand for IT resources and services. One issue results from the tremendous variety of
technology available today. While there were many IT professionals in the Baton Rouge area
and many others volunteering from around the country to come into the area, IT is also a very
specific skill due to the large variety in hardware and software paradigms. Thus, the utility of an
IT professional in a given circumstance is specific to the predominant IT infrastructure in the
space where improvisation is occurring.
4.3 Openness to Improvisation
Another influential factor in improvisation that was found in the data was that of
organizational openness to the process of improvisation. Prior research discusses an
organization’s openness to this process. Frequently, procedures are documented and policies
may require strict adherence to them. In contrast, one principle of improvisation is that the
situation and its characteristics will teach you what you need to know to find a solution if you let
it, rather than trying to force one (Crossan 1998). Further, to explore the benefits of
improvisation to the fullest, the improviser must maintain an open mind to the real goals in
dealing with the situation or problem.
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“what I want you to do is make a wish list. Let’s sit down for as long as you have, 20
minutes, 10 minutes, whatever in between patients, and you tell me everything that you need
in this facility and I’ll do my best to grant that wish”
Openness to improvisation is more of a problem than one might at first suspect. Many
organizations, especially those with a narrow focus, find they are unable to break away from
long-held approaches to interpreting customer needs and improvise efficiently or even
successfully (Weick 1993).
“But during that first week, it was just me going back and forth between ITS and there and
telling - asking what they need, coming back here telling them what they need and then
taking [back] the stuff that they needed. So I became the unofficial point person.”
Role improvisation was also found evidenced in the data. Role improvisation has also
been found to be of value in situations where improvisation and its benefits must be maximized
(Crossan 1998; Kamoche, Cunha et al. 2003). Role improvisation lets the mantle of leadership
travel dynamically to the person or group most qualified in the process currently at hand. In
successive turn, the leadership role moves on to the next individual or group as the focus moves
on to the next phase of the process or problem. Due to the lack of central leadership in the first
few days following the opening of the facilities, role improvisation in IT was constant during that
time as the focus moved from networks, to equipment, to software systems.
4.4 Timing in Improvisation
“there was no central authority in place for them to authenticate to so everybody had to know
a local I.D. and password on each machine. Hind sight looking back, had we known where
this was going to go, we would have put a little bit of structure in place around it but at the
time, everybody was just trying to respond [and] put out fires.”
The importance of timing in improvisation or knowing when and when not to improvise
is an important component in successfully mitigating a problem (Mendonca 2007). The
perceived risks and rewards are the deciding factors for the improviser. Will the improvised
solution work and what will failure cost? And if it works, what will we gain? These are a few of
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the questions influencing the decision to improvise. As the number of evacuees pouring in to the
PMAC and Field House multiplied, the plans for accommodating them quickly became invalid
and new plans had to be drawn up and implemented.
“the strategic national stockpile from the federal government had come in and brought just an
endless supply of goods over to the PMAC, but would not share any of that with the Special
Needs Shelter because the agreement was with Health and Hospitals, not Social Services. It
was the most ridiculous contractual nightmare I have ever witnessed. So, eventually, we just
commandeered those things “
“Well, I had violated about 10,000 rules. I said, that’s great, please report me to the state,
federal government, whatever you’ve got to do, thanks, bye. So, you know, I’m dealing with
stuff that has no, is of no consequence”
Decisions to override long standing plans and agreements were made and new
agreements made as the situation unfolded. Under normal circumstances, these types of actions
would be seen as chaos, but in the context of an extreme event they are an essential component
for success.
4.5 The Culture of Improvisation
“we had a puzzle that we needed to put together and we had no box top. So what we needed
to do was figure out, what is this picture supposed to look like and what part am I playing,
what piece am I and where do I fit. And I feel like that’s what happened, and, you know,
without people like Ric Simmons and Sean Robbins and John Morello and Brian Voss – oh
my God, we’d probably still be there.”
“There wasn’t any, ‘Hey, I don’t want to ask that person because they are going to make
more out of it or I’m concerned about that or that’s their turf.’ There wasn’t any turf; there
wasn’t any… you didn’t have time.”
Organizational culture may be one of the most influential factors in fostering
improvisation during extreme events. The openness of an organization to allowing actors in an
extreme event the freedom to improvise may be a deciding factor in the success or failure of the
efforts to mitigate that event. In practical terms, this means giving actors the freedom to get
involved, the room to make mistakes and learn from them (Crossan 1998). It also means being
open to allow actors from outside the organization to get involved in the process of
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improvisation. In the course of the Katrina effort, IT workers were given complete latitude and
support to address needs as they arose without significant intervention from managers remote to
the sites where the work was being done.
4.6 Conclusions
The data collected for this study, taken in its entirety, forms a rich gumbo of experiences.
For many of the subjects, their participation in the efforts to mitigate the suffering of tens of
thousands of evacuees following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita was one of the most rewarding and
personally challenging experiences of their lives. The stories related by the subjects lead to
several observations.
The first observation is that the traditional university environment presents a rich
environment for “bricolage” in improvising solutions in response to extreme events. The variety
and quantities of technologies and skills found on college campuses are relatively unique within
most communities. In addition, the presence of significant and capable manpower reserves in the
form of students present a resource in emergency response that is not available in many other
contexts.
Next, in connection with the leadership aspect of the research, the absence of IT
leadership and the successful effort to provide IT in an unprovisioned space may argue that
extensively pre-planned leadership organizations may not be necessary. Do natural leadership
structures form of their own accord during extreme events? In essence, will leadership
improvise itself if the necessary ingredients are present?
Finally, prior research states that improvisation can be enhanced by removing
organizational obstacles to creative thinking and by creating an organizational culture that values
creativity (Kendra and Wachtendorf 2006). This study speaks to the value of the diverse and
open culture of the university environment as a rich setting for mitigation efforts to extreme
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events. With a diverse mix of energetic, intelligent students; faculty members trained to think
creatively and in the abstract; and industry skilled staff, these organizations are already tasked
with the mission to solve the problems of today’s society. As such, they come ready-made with
a unique and potent set of ingredients that can be used to form an improvisational engine that in
turn, can be directed towards extreme events. The research of Kendra (2006) supports this
finding as well through the assertion that there is utility in community organizations even in
terrorist-attack scenarios and that these organizations may be even be more appropriate in civil
contexts.
4.7 Future Research
The opportunities for future research in the context of the 2005 hurricanes that struck
Louisiana and Mississippi are too numerous to count. Some of the questions raised in the course
of this study are IT related and some are only indirectly related. For example, one question
raised by the study was “How significantly does the motivation of the actors influence the
success or failure of the actors attempting to improvise solutions following extreme events?”
Did the magnitude of the event generate a level of motivation in the public that basically
overwhelmed or overran the problem?
Another question raised was, “Does the solution-oriented and improvisational nature of
IT work contribute uniquely to success of IT professionals in responding to critical demands?”
Is the high-demand, frequently improvisational nature of IT an ongoing dress rehearsal for
extreme events?
And finally from a theoretical standpoint, additional research in this area could focus on
the effects that the Katrina experience had on the technology organizations on campus as
explained by adaptive structuration or social theory. Some artifacts of the Katrina experience
discussed in the course of the interviews point to a relationship to certain constructs contained in
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those theories, but data elicitation was not directed on those aspects and thus no conclusions can
be made.
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Appendix A – Interview Guide
Interview Guide
(Some questions derived from”Decision Support for Improvisation in Response to Extreme
Events” David Mendonca (forthcoming publication))
1. During the several week period following Hurricane Katrina, what major issues or
challenges were you were involved in finding or implementing solutions for?
2. In which of these issues or problems did you use, or consider using technology as part of
a solution or method to address the problem?
3. For each issue or challenge in which technology was used or considered
a. What were your specific goals or objectives in dealing with this situation?
b. Were there obstacles to overcome in finding a solution?
c. What were the technologies and/or strategies chosen to deal with this problem?
d. What were other options, technologies and/or strategies you considered to deal
with this problem? Other courses of action?
e. Had you ever faced a problem similar to this before?
f. Was time a factor in dealing with this problem?
g. What type of training or experience helped you with this problem?
h. What specific type of training or experience do you think would have been
helpful in this situation?
i. Did any persons or groups assist you in choosing a solution and what roles did
they play in the crisis? In the particular problem?
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Appendix B – Cognitive Maps
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Subject 1

9 secure
communications with
outside agencies via
VPN (unexplored
opportunity)

13 concerns over
statutory limits
(HIPAA)

8 political
maneuvering for
resources

10 some VOIP phones
available locally

6 wireless network
available

-

11 some capacity to
bring wired
connections into
PMAC

1 establish local
and regional
communication for
agencies
4 alternative
communication
methods (radios,
etc)

3 campus email
systems available

7 voice conferencing
capabilities
(unexplored
opportunity)

-

-

5 cellular systems
saturated

2 locate and
communicate with
staff

14 instant messaging
broadcast system
(unexplored
opportunity)

-

36 site coordinator
named

12 loss of some
organizations email
systems

-

25 time constraints

22 better IT
training for
responders
(unexplored
opportunity)

15 capture and
organize evacuee
information

20 coordinate large
numbers of
volunteers

24 vendors provided
adhoc software and
development
35 lack of central
authority,
leadership

-

18 demand for adhoc
database
applications
23 agencies provided
some software system
support

-

34 coordinate agency
demands for IT
resources

19 existing agency
systems incapable of
remote access

-

16 concerns with
authentication &
security of data

21 central emergency
applications
framework
(unexplored
opportunity)

37 vendors provide
additional phones,
computers

26 provide IT
resources to
agencies & displaced
organizations

33 some resources
available locally

32 insufficient
staff to deploy &
configure IT
resources in a
timely manner

27 inventory control
to prevent loss of
resources

31 decision made to
relax security

29 common carriers
unavailable to bring
additional resources
into emergency area

38

17 decision to use
generic
authentication
28 spreadsheet
software

Subject 2

13 lack of on-site
wiring
6 emotional state of
individuals

8 some IT hardware
availble locally

2 enable
communications with
external units

12 competition for
resources

3 IT help present
on-site 24x7

5 initial lack of
central coordination
& control

-

11 inventory
controls put in
place to prevent
loss of scarce
equipment

-

1 support emergency
agencies coming to
the site

7 limited
availability of IT
equipment

-

9 quick needs
assessment performed

10 micromanagement
of IT resources

4 coordinator for
site finally named

15 direction of IT
efforts falls to a
single individual by
default

14 need for IT
command center to
control IT requests
& resources

19 vendor
contributions of
equipment &
personnel

18 create adhoc
information systems
/ database

17 track patients,
evacuees and staff
16 lack of central
IT command center

-

20 need to secure
protected
information
21 no known
pre-existing
software solutions
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Subject 3

26 executive
emergency committee
directing efforts

17 track information
on volunteers and
evacuees

24 availability of
outsourced email
services

27 some IT
implications of
directives are
unforeseen

25 find temporary
housing for evacuees

22 internal central
IT command & control

19 support displaced
institutions

11 change existing
software
applications or
develop ad-hoc
applications

9 facilitate
enrollment of
displaced students

1 enable
communications
between campus units
and their
constituencies

-

-

-

3 previous
experiences
preparing for
hurricanes

12 urgency to make
decisions results in
higher incidence of
non-optimal
solutions

5 lack of timeliness
of communications
from decision makers
and functional units

8 broadcasts
sometimes took
longer to accomplish
due to absence of
trained staff

13 rapidly changing
priorities for
solutions

14 rapidly changing
solution
requirements

2 "broadcast" email
application to
communicate with
large groups

-

-

10 communications
gap between IT and
users exacerbated by
crisis

4 setup permanent
and ad-hoc websites

-

16 significant time
required to develop
solutions utilizing
enterprise-level
development tools

23 pre-established
lines of
communication
between IT and
functional units

18 vendors as a
source for software,
machines, expertise

20 available
capacity in existing
commodity systems
such as course
management and web
hosting

6 efforts become
reactive rather than
proactive

7 unavailable staff
in campus units
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21 virtual server
infrastructure
(VMWare)

Subject 4

1 demand for
information systems

-

7 rapidly changing
priorities

14 good
relationships with
vendors

8 lack of
communications to
prevent parallel
efforts

-

13 inadequate state
and federal
leadership

15 leverage personal
contacts

3 leadership by
state or federal
authority

2 enable short range
communications
(campus)

9 cellular
saturation removes
cell service as
communication method

4 clear goals for IT
groups

11 campus radio
system
10 availability of
text messaging

5 value of IT
organization is
ability to solve
problems

12 PDA's,
Blackberry's
16 utilize
volunteers

6 role of IT well
understood by IT
staff

18 issues due to IT
skills being
somewhat specialized

17 capture
information about
skills & capabilites

19 too much variety
in skills and
equipment
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Subject 6

7 shifting
priorities

2 shelter and treat
evacuees

16 lack of
sufficient VOIP
skills

6 time related
pressure

11 adequately
skilled & trained
staff

5 inter and
intra-agency
communications

3 information system
to track evacuees

-

-

12 organization
familiar with
responding to
emergency needs for
network services

-

4 lack of staff
skilled in using
information systems
14 disregard for
existing
installation
standards

1 insufficient
resources
(equipment) for
responding agencies

9 available
computers,
conference phones,
printers, fax

-

-

-

-

8 new, undeployed
technology solutions
(VOIP)

13 uncertainty of
authority to deploy
resources

10 agencies brought
little or no
equipment to site

18 no mechanism for
prioritization of
deployment of
resources

17 lack of wired
network connections
in facilites
designated for
emergency operations

19 no central
coordination of
allocation of
resources

15 extreme desire by
staff to contribute
to response effort

21 WPS cellular
priority service may
have opened cell
lines (unavailable
possible solution)

20 saturation of
cellular services
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Subject 7

1 facilitate
communications for
evacuees to contact
family, etc

6 IT organization
called in to provide
phones

10 doctor moves
bleachers to make
room; cuts phone
lines

-

8 no chargers for
evacuee cell phones

7 phone bank set up
for evacuees
16 laws constrain
ability to transmit
information

9 bought chargers at
local retailers

-

2 capture
information on
evacuees

-

5 provide IT
resources to
emergency agencies

-

-

17 large emergency
organization begins
effort to change
processes already in
place and
functioning

18 vendor donations
of equipment &
personnel

19 agencies brought
little of their own
equipment to the
site

15 multiple groups
working on info
systems to maintain
information; too
many options, too
late

4 organize
volunteers
25 information
system to coordinate
volunteers
(unavailable
solution)

20 improvised teams
to address list of
agency needs

22 categorize
volunteers by skill
24 phone bank set up
to communicate with
volunteers

3 track inventory of
medical supplies

12 emergency
supplies tracking
system (unavailable
solution)

11 supplies tracked
with spreadsheet

13 federal agencies
not sharing supplies
21 students,
faculty, and staff
eager to get
involved

23 questionnaire /
spreadsheet to
capture & organize
information

14 supplies
commandeered
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Subject 7-2

1 establish command
& control

4 re-unite "lost"
children with
families

-

2 university
leadership meeting
twice daily

3 individuals
jockeying for
position in relief
effort

5 no transportation
available to
re-unite children
with families when
located

6 agency
specializing on
missing children
arrives

-

7 need
communications
technology
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Subject 14

2 develop map for
relief agencies
showing designated
locations for relief
operations

-

1 How many
people/beds can the
PMAC sports arena
accommodate?

-

13 insufficient time
to assess true needs

9 campus facility
planners best
prepared to answer
question (unexplored
opportunity)

10 task and outcome
clearly defined
3 faculty engaged to
find answer

11 up to date maps
would have cut time
to produce and
update

15 central store for
campus GIS data
(unavailable
solution)

12 HVAC personnel
have information on
environmentals

4 estimate of floor
space in facility

7 unintended
consequences as a
result of out of
date facility
information

14 maps stored in
individual
workstations
5 information from
architectural
drawings

8 multiple GIS data
formats
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6 drawings in old,
out of date
technology

Subject 15

1 Track evacuees
arriving and passing
through site

12 solution platform
with power and
network independence
(unexplored
opportunity)

-

4 collection of
available local
resources before
site opened for
evacuees

24 appropriate level
of response EOC
activation model
rather than light
switch model
(unavailable
possible solution)

6 contention by
agencies for data

-

18 lack of
consistent data
gathering approach

-

7 time not initially
a factor

2 diverse collection
of information on
evacuees

-

-

-

-

11 demand for IP
connectivity
5 existing systems
not capable of data
interchange

-

21 minimal command &
control

-

3 no pre-existing
information systems
in place to fully
manage information
being collected

10 limited Internet
connectivity
8 need for a
distributed
information system
to collect and
maintain data

17 value of
improvisational and
managerial skills
critical

9 availability of
common software
drove solutions
initially

19 vendor access to
international
resources
14 "Groove" solution
developed by on and
off-site vendor team

13 vendor's previous
experience with
disaster response

15 pre-configured,
field-deployable
system (unavailable
possible solution)

20 high flexibility
of Groove product

16 vendor employee
"grassroots",
eagerness to
contribute
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22 campus leadership

23 no coordinated
state leadership
on-site

Subject 17

1 track patients in
critical care and
special needs
facilities

11 lack of "small"
IT, phones,
communications,
wiring, etc

-

2 initially,
everything being
tracked on paper

-

-

13 cellular
saturation

5 "Groove" software

14 Blackberry
messaging overcomes
comm channel
saturation

15 need information
about University
people, contacts,
phone number, 3rd
party agreements

10 organize
volunteers

-

3 multiple
spreadsheets
tracking different
information sets

4 vendors donate
computers, software,
and personnel

-

8 no pre-existing
information systems
to handle needs

-

-

-

-

9 responders and
doctors distracted
from patient care

12 separate campus
groups working on
developing systems
to address same
problems

16 need
communications with
buses and
helicopters bringing
evacuees to LSU site

7 need information
system to track
donations

-

17 decision to
unload and triage
evacuees arriving by
buses at offsite
location

6 people &
organizations want
to make donations

19 no
pre-established
communications
protocols
18 LSU personnel
sent to checkpoint
between LSU and N to
provide early
warning of bus
arrivals ... O to
provide early
warning of bus
arrivals
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Subject 22

16 treat injured and
track evacuees

18 vendor donated
computers and
software

1 Setup agency
emergency operations
centers

-

17 limited computers
and software
available on-site

-

19 track and
organize volunteers

-

12 competition for
resources

-

2 establish
inter-agency and
agency parent site
communications

9 skilled personnel
available to
implement technology

-

13 lack of overall
response coordinator

15 stranded or
unavailable
personnel

3 need comm channels
in place

-

11 necessary IT
skills present

10 inability of IT
personnel to
organize their
efforts and
improvise

8 satellite uplinks
available

7 contractor
provided wiring

-

6 HIPAA concerns

4 lack of on-site
wiring

-

5 security of
wireless network
14 no previous
comparable
experience
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